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The European Commission has recently agreed upon and put forward a proposal 
for a new EU regulatory framework for chemicals. The proposed new system, 
called REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals), will 
require enterprises that manufacture or import more than one tonne of a chemical 
substance per year to register this substance in a central database and to provide 
safety information on the substance to a central agency and to customers. In 
addition, companies that produce and import chemicals will have to assess the 
risks arising from their use and take the necessary measures to manage any risk 
they find. Substances of "high concern" will require authorisation for their use by 
the Commission, with "no authorisation" implying restrictions of various kind 
including a complete removal from the European market. "REACH is a 
groundbreaking proposal," as Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström said 
in an EU press release. "Once adopted, it will allow us to take advantage of the 
benefits of chemicals without exposing ourselves and the environment to risks. 
Thus it will create a win-win situation for industry, workers and citizens, and our 
ecosystem. It will give Europe's citizens the high level of protection that they have 
the right to expect. The EU will have one of the most progressive chemicals 




Nobody doubts that chemical substances can be hazardous to the environment and 
to human health. Chemicals have been linked to many types of cancer, leukemia, 
skin and eye disorders, asthma and many other diseases, not to mention various 
large-scale desasters attached to names like Seveso, Bhopal and so on. Eliminat-
ing or controlling such hazards is certainly a worthwhile task.
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On the other hand, even good things can be overdone. The present article presents 
evidence that this currently appears to be happening in the policy towards 
chemicals of the EU. In particular, it argues that the Commission’s “Extended 
Impact Assessment” of October 29, 2003
4 grossly overestimates the potential 
health benefits of the new legislation both in “real” and in monetary terms. In a 
chapter “Potential long-term health benefits of risk reduction measures – an 
illustration”, the assessment’s authors state  “…the total health benefits (of 
REACH) would be in the order of magnitude of € 50 billion over the next 30 
years.” This monetary value for the diseases allegedly avoided via REACH is 
discussed at length in sections 2-4. As a “starting point for the amount of disease 
attributable to chemicals”, the Commission’s “illustration” uses an estimate from 
a World Bank Environment Strategy Paper on “links between environment, public 
health, and poverty” which was never published in the peer-reviewed scientific 
literature and which attributes between 0.6 and 2.5 % of the burden of disease in 
established market Economies, as measured by disability adjusted life years 
(DALYs; see section 3) to man-made chemicals.
5  These fractions were obtained 
from DALYs due to the following diseases: liver and pancreas cancer, melanoma 
and other skin cancers, lymphomas and multiple myelomas, endocrine disorders, 
unipolar major depression, cataracts, nephritis and nephrosis, rheumatoid arthritis, 
congenital anomalies (excluding spina bifida and congenital heart anomalies), and 
poisonings. A 5 % (“conservative estimate”) and a 20 % (“liberal estimate”) 
proportion of the DALYS caused by these diseases were then attributed to “acute 
and chronic exposure to pesticides and non-point-source industrial contaminants 
in the environment”, corresponding to 619,000 (5 %) or 2,477,000 (20 %) of a  
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total of 12,386,000 DALYs due to these particular diseases, or to 0.6% or 2.5% of 
the total burden of all diseases. 
The authors of the Commission’s Extended Impact Assessment decided to adopt 
“a conservative figure of 1%” for their scenario and made the assumption that 
10% thereof “will be identified and tackled by REACH”. In other words: 0.1 % of 
all diseases occurring in the EU could be avoided via REACH.  
The exercise described above is both unfounded and misleading. It is unfounded 
because the diseases from the World Bank’s scenario are not  – with minor 
exceptions –typically caused by agrochemicals or by chemicals in general.
6 It is 
misleading because, even if it were correct, the pertinent exposures would be 
outside the scope of REACH, as specified in the proposal,
7 and because, perhaps 
even more importantly, the EU Commission’s account of the additional 
(marginal) benefits of REACH is basically a gross account. It largely ignores both 
the unintended side-effects of banning or restricting the use of chemicals and the 
benefits of having them in the first place. Chemicals, whether dangerous or not, 
serve some purpose, many of them related to human health and the environment. 
If these substances are restricted or replaced by less efficient ones, this purpose 
suffers. 
The EU commission also does not distinguish properly between total and 
marginal effects. Even if the total, cumulative benefit of regulating the production 
and the use of chemicals is not to be questioned at all, the additional benefit of 
additional legislation might still be negligible or even negative. As U.S. Chief 
Justice Stephen Breyer has noted in his pathbreaking study on risk regulation, 
trying to “go that last mile” can be pursued “to the point where it brings about 
more harm than good.”
8. 
These reasons for not trusting the Commission’s estimates are independent of 
each other. They are supplemented by a critical analysis of the monetary values 
placed on potential real benefits. The authors of the Impact Assessment conclude 
from the above quoted 0.1% of all DALYs saved that “45,000 DALYs will be 
avoided every year due to REACH”. As “on average 10 DALYs are equivalent to  
4 
one life saved”, 4,500 lives could then be saved per year by REACH. A value per 
statistical life of 1 million € is then adopted and the total health benefit of REACH 
is calculated, after suitable discounting,  to be € 50 billion over the next 30 years. 
Even if one took the alleged life years saved by REACH at face value, the 
methods used by the Commission to assign a monetary value to these life years 
saved are flawed. The point here is not that the Commission unduly puts a 
monetary value on human life. This is impossible, and no evaluator in his sane 
mind has ever tried. Rather, the point is that the Commission assigns incorrect 
values to people’s willingness to pay for a reduction in the probability of injury 
and death. In a world of finite resources and infinite desires, individuals and 
government alike have to balance resources spent for one purpose against 
alternative uses of these resources, and it appears that Europe’s citizens, if they 
had a choice, might well want to spend the resources expended on the REACH 
program rather differently. 
Contrary to what Commissioner Wallström believes, REACH will therefore put 
all parties concerned in a lose-lose situation and will introduce one of the most 
wasteful chemical management systems in the world. 
 
 
2. The real benefits of REACH 
This section argues that the estimates of the real benefits of REACH, as promised 
in the EU Commission’s extended impact assessment of Oct. 29, 2003, are overly 
optimistic. Even if the “acute and chronic exposure to pesticides and non-point-
source industrial contaminants in the environment” on which the World Bank’s 
DALY estimate is based were completely within the scope of REACH (which it is 
not, as argued in section 1), the estimated real benefits would still be questionable. 
A second major flaw in the EU Commission's account of the benefits of restricting 
the use of hazardous chemicals is the disregard of the benefits of having them in  
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the first place. The most prominent case in point is the worldwide ban of certain 
pesticides such as DDT. In the wake of Rachel Carson's 1962 international 
bestseller Silent Spring, its production and its use have been banned in many 
countries of the world. While this has saved a lot of insects and of birds, it has 
also killed hundreds of thousands of people who fell victim to resurgent outbursts 
of various infectious diseases. For the 1990s, this death toll even approached two 
million each year. In the meantime, DDT has been reallowed in many countries. 




Table 1: Malaria cases in Sri Lanka before and after banning DDT 
year  number of cases 
1946  2.800.000 
1961  110 
1962  31 
1963 (DDT is banned)  17 
1964  150 
1965  308 
1966  499 
1967  3.466 
1968  2.500.000 
 
Statistics such as these have led Hubert Markl, a renowned German bio-scientist 
and former president of the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft, DFG) to conclude that the side-effects of banning DDT have killed 
more people than the well known biaccumulative and toxic side effects of DDT 
themselves ("Die Nebenwirkungen des DDT-Verbotes haben mit Sicherheit mehr 
Menschen das Leben gekostet als die Nebenwirkungen des DDT")
10 
The same applies to various other pesticides. Banning the pesticide EDB (ethylene 
dibromide) in the U.S. for instance may have eliminated a very slight cancer risk,  
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at the expense of a much more dangerous cancer-causing fungus left on the food 
that used to be treated with the pesticide. Other examples of hazardous chemicals 
which have also positive effects for human health include fluoride, which is 
linked to health problems of various kind, but also protects our teeth, or chlorine. 
Chlorine, without any doubt, is toxic, but it is also a key ingredient in the 
worldwide battle against many infectious diseases such as cholera. There is for 
instance universal consensus among public health experts that the massive 
outbreak of cholera which has hit Peru in 1991, killing 7.000 people and afflicting 
800.000 others, was caused by Peru’s decision to ban the chlorination of drinking 
water, based on American risk studies that had shown a slight chance of 
developing cancer due to chlorination by-products. 
Although there is much talk about considering both sides of this coin in the EU 
Commission’s “Extended impact assessment”, such unintended side-effects of 
banning or restricting the use of chemicals are largely ignored both by the EU 
Commission and by the World Bank strategy paper upon which the EU 
Commission's estimates are based. The latter paper attributes between 0,6% and 
2,5% of the total burden of disease in established market economies to pollution 
from agro-industrial chemicals and chemical pollution from diffuse sources, 
without accounting for the diseases that have been prevented by these chemicals, 
and without accounting for what would happen if agro-industrial chemicals would 
disappear. This is in violation of a rule proposed in another World Bank paper to 
always establish the complete counterfactual when evaluating public health 
projects: What happens with and without the project. Here, one half of both the 
with – and the without part is missing. 
The EU Commission's account of potential health benefits of discovering and 
restricting hazardous chemicals is thus a gross account. The net balance also 
involves potential health benefits which are foregone by not allowing to use such 
substances. 
Even the gross account is flawed, however. It does not take note of the criticism 
that has emerged in recent years of the epidemiological and statistical basis of  
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attributing ill health and the risk of cancer to man-made origins
11 The two 
extrapolations involved in using the results of animal experiments, from high dose 
to low dose and from animals to humans, have come under serious attack, and the 
effects of occupational and environmental man-made carcinogens have been 
shown to be rather negligible as compared to lifestyle and genetic factors. Setting 
aside the well known carcinogenic effects of asbestos, “exposure levels for many 
industrial hazards have been progressively reduced in many Western Countries 
since the 1930s, and by the late 1970s it was assumed, probably correctly, that the 
occupational exposure levels then current would contribute a very small 
proportion of future cancer incidence” (Peto 2001, p. 392). Therefore, the 
assumption in the EU Commission’s Extended Impact Assessment that 1% of the 
total burden of disease in the EU is caused by man-made chemicals is not 
“conservative” but wrong. 
Finally, even if this assumption were correct, it is still unwarranted to infer, as is 
done by the EU Commission, that a substantial amount of this burden of disease 
could be tackled and prevented by REACH. The burden of disease caused by 
chemicals, as computed by the World Bank, is due to historical exposure or incor-
rect usage of legal substances or accidental poisoning, all of which will not be 
touched by REACH. Therefore, the EU Commission’s efforts at further reducing 
exposure to man-made hazardous chemicals somehow seem like flogging a dead 
horse, and the net benefits might well be negative or zero. 
 
 
3. The monetary benefits of REACH 
The critique in section 2 concerns mostly basic issues of measurement. The pre-
sent section is more technical. It is about comparing costs and benefits, and about 
putting a monetary value on avoiding human suffering and death. 
According to the EU Commission, "the total health benefits [of the REACH 
program] would be of the order of magnitude of € 50 billion over the next 30  
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years."
12 Although this figure is derived from an "illustrative scenario" rather than 
a fully developed socio-economic model for the consequences of REACH, it 
clearly meant to convey the message that REACH's benefits by far outweigh its 
costs, and is consistently quoted by Mrs. Wallström as proof that REACH is 
economically meaningful. 
The € 50 billion benefit is based on the assumptions that 
(i) 1% of the overall burden of disease in developed market economies, as meas-
ured by Disability Adjusted Life Years – DALYs, is attributable to agro-industrial 
chemicals and chemical pollution from diffuse sources, 
(ii) 10% of this burden will be identified and removed by REACH (with positive 
effects on public health starting 10 years after its implementation), 
(iii) 10 DALYs are "equivalent" to one life saved, and 
(iv) one life saved is worth € 1 million. 
Taken together, these assumptions imply 45000 DALYs or 4500 lives saved per 
year (starting 10 years after REACH is implemented) for 20 years, producing total 
benefits of 4500 × 1 million = € 4.5 billion each year from year 10 onward. 
Discounting by 3% per year then yields a present value of monetary benefits of 
roughly € 50 billion. 
This scenario is misleading. It does not even approximate the true benefits of 
REACH, because 
•  the Commission's estimate of DALYs saved is much too high (see also 
section 2), 
•  the identification of 10 DALYs to one life saved is incorrect, and 
•  a uniform value of € 1 million for one life saved does not make sense. 
These issues will be taken up in turn, starting with the alleged value of € 1 million 
for one life saved. The point here is not that the Commission unduly puts a mone-
tary value on human life. This is impossible, and no economist in his sane mind 
has ever tried. Rather, one puts monetary values on various probabilities of death. 
If somebody accepts a 1 in a thousand chance to prematurely die in a traffic acci- 
9 
dent within one year, in exchange for savings of € 200 on a car without an airbag 





of death is worth € 200 to that person. If 1000 individuals had preferences like 
this, the whole group would be willing to accept 1000 × € 200 = € 200 000 in 
exchange for one statistical death. 
This distinction between a statistical death, which affects only populations and 
involves only probabilities of death for the individuals which comprise such 
populations, and an individual death which affects a particular person known in 
advance, is crucial to all economic evaluations of life-saving programs of any 
kind. It was probably first introduced by Thomas Schelling in 1968 and further 
elaborated by many others.
13 The upshot is that there is no contradiction between 
the pricelessness of an individual life and a finite price of a certain probability of 
death. 
Let this price be p for a 1% probability of death. It is sometimes referred to as the 
"willingness to pay" for a 1 percentage point reduction of the probability of dying 
within some specified period of time, say one year (equivalently: the amount of 
money one would accept in exchange for a 1 percentage point increase of the 
probability of dying within that same time period, or the amount of money one 
would pay to avoid that increase). The value of a statistical life is then 
p/0.01 = 100 × p. 
More generally: given a probability d of death, the value of a statistical life is 
d
) d ( p
VSL =  , 
where the notation p(d) highlights the fact that the price depends on the 
probability of dying d: If we are willing to pay € 10 000 to avoid an increase of 1 
percentage point (starting from some baseline probability  d of death, e.g. starting 
from 1% for one year which is typical for males in their 50s in developed market  
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economies), we will almost certainly be willing to pay more than double that 
amount to avoid an increase of 2 percentage points, and we would be willing to 
pay everything we possibly could to avoid an increase of 99 percentage points 
(i.e. a certain death). 
The following figure clarifies this point. It depicts the typical willingness to pay to 
reduce the probability d of death to zero. According to basic economic principles 
of utility maximisation under uncertainty, this will usually be a convex and 
increasing function p(d) of d. It can be viewed both as the willingness to pay for a 
reduction of d to zero or as the amount of money one would accept in exchange 
for an increase the probability of death from 0 to d. Although there is some 
discussion in health economics about the equivalence of these interpretations, 
both will be used interchangeably below. 
 
Figure 1: Willingness to pay to avoid probability of death 
 
For most individuals, the function p(d) will approach their available budget at 
100% - we would be willing to pay anything we can to avoid a certain death. 
However, for probabilities d of death below 100%, there is a much smaller 
amount of money that we are willing to pay to reduce this probability to zero (or  
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would accept as monetary compensation for an increase of this probability from 0 
to d). 
In most applications, what is meant by "willingness to pay" is not the function 
p(d), but rather the slope p'(d) of the function p(d). This is likewise an increasing 
function of d and gives the willingness to pay for marginal decreases in the prob-
ability of death. For small values of 
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and it is usually this quantity that most investigators have in mind when talking 
about willingness to pay. 
Such technicalities aside, and no matter whether the focus is on marginal or on 
absolute willingness to pay, there is universal agreement that both vary wildly 
across individuals and time. In particular, it is recognized by all economists who 
work in this field (and also derivable from basic economic principles), that both 
p(d) and p'(d) depend on income, age, health status (as measured in part by the 
"baseline" probability of dying  d), on various other personal circumstances (for 
people who commit suicide, both p(d) and p'(d) are zero), on the underlying time 
period (the willingness to pay for a 1 percentage point reduction in the probability 
of dying within the next hour is greater than the willingness to pay for a 1 per-
centage point reduction within the next 10 years), and also on the cause of death: 
many people might be willing to pay more for a reduction in the risk of dying 
from cancer than for a reduction in the risk of dying from a heart attack. There is 
therefore no such thing as a uniform value of € 1 million for one statistical life. 
Statistical lives are valued differently by different people; they are even valued 
differently by the same people at different times and under different circum-
stances. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, estimates of the values of statistical lives obtained 
from surveys vary across wide ranges, and a value of € 1 million for one statistical  
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life can therefore be at best some average across millions of individual evaluations 
across the population of the European Union. 
Even as such, it is misleading. It is much too large, because 
(a) the contingent valuation studies from which the figure was derived mostly 
refer to rich countries like Canada or the US. As willingness to pay depends on 
income, it is smaller in most countries of the EU. 
(b) most individuals overestimate small man-made risks by huge amounts. 
As to objection (a), it is important to keep in mind the budget constraints under 
which choices are made. If the EU Commission is really serious about maximis-
ing the welfare of its citizens, it has to take account of the fact that poor people are 
usually willing to pay less for a given reduction in the probability of injury or 
death than rich people. This is not because they have less desire to live, or because 
the life of poor people is worth less than the life of rich people. It is because poor 
people also want decent housing, stylish clothes, luxurious cars and fashionable 
holidays which rich people already have. In a recent survey of the willingness to 
pay for trachoma control in Tanzania, households were willing to pay an average 
of about 100 Tanzanian shillings to reduce this risk to zero.
14 Trachoma is an 
infection which results in scarring of the inturning eyelashes which then scratch 
the surface of the eye (trichiasis) and can cause blindness. In some areas of 
Tanzania, about 8% of persons over 55 are affected. Given an exchange rate of 
1300 Tanzanian shillings to 1 Euro (Dec. 2003), the avoidance of one statistical 
case of blindness is thus worth 
€ (100/1300)/0.08 = € 0.96 
to a typical citizen of Tanzania. 
A typical citizen of the U.S. would certainly be willing to pay much more. 
The same applies to willingness to pay for a reduction of the probability of death. 
In 2001, the income per capita in the European Union was 47.3% of the income 
per capita in the U.S.. Assuming a unitary income elasticity of willingness to pay,  
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as is common in the literature, the value of a statistical life in the EU is only about 
half the value of a statistical life in the U.S. 
As to objection (b), it has long been known that individuals tend to overestimate 
the probability of rare events, such as being struck by lightning, and tend to 
underestimate the probability of common events such as dying from heart 
disease.
15 This overestimation of small risks has serious implications for 
willingness to pay for the reduction or elimination of health hazards which are 
rather small, like dying from poisoning with chemicals or from occupational 
cancer induced by chemicals. If the individual thinks the probability is p, when in 
fact it is p*, where p* < p, and if the individual is willing to pay € x to eliminate 
that risk, and when the researcher uses the true probability p*, the reported value 
for a statistical life is 
VSLreported = x/p*, 
whereas the true value of a statistical life is 
VSLtrue = x/p. 
Since p* < p, we have 
VSLreported   > VSLtrue . 
There is considerable evidence that such misjudgements occur. In a survey of the 
early respective literature, Covello (1983) reports on numerous studies which 
unanimously find that small risks from man-made sources are consistently over-
rated, often by factors of 10 and more.
16 Using 5 as a conservative estimate, 
objections (a) and (b) taken together then imply that the value of € 1 million for 
one statistical life in the EU is likewise too large, by a factor of at least 2 x 5 = 10. 
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4. Statistical lives and the burden of disease 
Another key step in the Commission's derivation of the € 50 billion benefit of 
REACH is the conversion of 10 disability adjusted life years (DALYs) allegedly 
at stake through agro-industrial chemicals and chemical pollution from diffuse 
sources to one statistical life. However, equating the price of 10 DALYs to the 
price of one statistical life, as is done by the Commission, is unwarranted for vari-
ous reasons even if there were no disagreement on the monetary value of statisti-
cal lives themselves. 
DALYs, due to some cause or risk factor i, and for some population of individu-
als, are simply the sum of years of life lost YLLi and years lived with disability 
(YLDi):
17 
DALYi = YLLi + YLDi . 
The sum of years of life lost YLLi is computed with reference to a life table which 
has a life expectancy at birth of 80 for males and of 82.5 for females. This implies 
for instance that a man dying at 65 loses on average 17.5 years of life, and a man 
dying at 75 loses on average 10.17 years of life (Murray 1996, table 1.1; the final 
figures which enter into YLLi are somewhat smaller due to discounting and to 
attaching different weights to different ages, but such technicalities will here be 
put aside). 
The years lived with disability YLDi are simply the years lived with non-fatal 
health outcomes due to cause i. Putting aside problems of apportioning non-fatal 
health outcomes to specific etiologies, the major challenge here is to develop a set 
of weights for time spent in different health states. The DALY approach is to 
attach to each year lived in less than perfect health a weight in the range form 0 to 
1 depending on the severity of the condition, the weight being determined by a 
panel of public health practitioners in a rather complicated discussion process. 
This procedure is thus a special case of the more general Quality-Adjusted-Life-
Years (QUALY) methodology, the major difference being that QUALYs are usu- 
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ally computed as something to be gained from interventions, whereas DALYs are 
seen as something lost due to health hazards and other risks. 
The pros and cons of competing methods of measuring and valuing ill health are 
at length discussed elsewhere
18 and shall not concern us here. The bottom line is 
that, given whichever way of weighting years spent in ill health, and given a finite 
and exhaustive number N of possible risks to health, the total burden of disease 
for a population is then 
Total burden = DALY1 + ... + DALYN , 
the presumption being that this burden would be reduced by DALYi if risk factor i 
were removed. At least this is what the Commission tacitly assumes. 
In fact, however, the marginal reduction in DALYs if cause i were removed need 
not be equal to DALYi . The latter quantity is the portion of the total when all 
risks to health are removed at once. It is however often argued by environmental-
ists that many risks to health reinforce each other. Or equivalently: eliminating 
only one risk at a time does less good per risk than eliminating several risks at 
once. Therefore, the marginal effect of removing only one risk to health might 
well be less than the proportion of the total effect due to that risk if all risks were 
removed simultaneously. Formally: 
New burden after elimination of risk i > Total burden – DALYi . 
This is only a minor point, however. The major point is that the two components 
that make up DALYs, years of life lost YLL and years lived with disability YLD, 
are given identical monetary values when in fact the values placed on them by 
individuals are very different. 
When asked what they were willing to pay to avoid the risk of ill health or injury, 
the price for most people usually drops by a factor of up to 1000. While people in 
rich countries like the US are willing to pay € 1 million or more to avoid a statisti-
cal death, they are willing to pay only € 1000 to avoid one statistical case of skin 
poisoning by an insecticide (to cite just one example where the willingness to pay 
for a non-fatal heath outcome has been elicited with a questionnaire). For almost  
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all non-fatal health outcomes, willingness to pay to avoid such risks is far below 
the willingness to pay to avoid the risk of death (in Tanzania, as we have seen 
above, the willingness to pay for one statistical case of not turning blind is less 
than € 1.00). 
This difference is not reflected in the YLD-figures, however. While years lived 
with disability are downweighted by factors ranging from 0 to 1 which depend on 
the severity of the condition (for instance, years lived with deafness are multiplied 
by 0.3, years lived with paraplegia are multiplied by 0.6), this downweighting 
does not suffice to capture the reduction in the willingness to pay to avoid such 
risks. 
Given therefore that the figure of 45.000 DALYs is correct that, according to the 
Commission, will be avoided every year due to REACH, it is crucial to also know 
its components YLL and YLD. According to Murray et al., both contribute about 
one half to the overall burden of disease in established market economies.
19 If 
agro-industrial chemicals and chemical pollution from diffuse sources mainly 
result in non-fatal health outcomes rather than premature death, the YLD-part for 
these sources of disease might even dominate. Taking 50% as an estimate, the 
number of DALYs to be transformed into statistical deaths is thus not 45.000 but 
rather 22.500, the number of years of life lost. 
The final step in the EU Commission’s argument is the conversion 
10 DALYs = 1 statistical life. 
This is based on an estimated 10 DALYs lost on average by one death and will 
not be disputed here. Rather, one might question whether the implied willingness 
to pay to avoid one DALY (or to avoid the YLL-part of one DALY) is really one 
tenth the willingness to pay to avoid one statistical death. There is evidence in the 
literature that it might well be less, so it is more than 10 DALYs which are 




5. Competing risks to life 
A final argument concerns the efficiency of REACH. Even taking its real and 
monetary benefits for granted, i.e. assuming that the alleged reductions in risks to 
health will indeed materialize, the REACH program is certainly among the least 
efficient ways to achieve this aim. Today, the major health hazards for citizens of 
the European Union are alcohol, tobacco, fat, and lack of exercise. Also high on 
the list are air pollution, hypertension, illicit drugs and unsafe sex. The following 
table, compiled from Murray and Lopez (1996, chapter 6) gives the percentage of 
deaths and DALYs attributable to selected risk factors in established market 
economies. It shows that, by telling Europeans how to engage in safer sex, 20 
times more DALYs could be saved than is possible by REACH (according to the 
EU Commission, the percentage of DALYs to be saved by REACH is 0.1%). And 
the gains from not allowing able-bodied customers to use elevators or moving 
walkways in airports and department stores (or otherwise inducing Europeans to 
engage in more physical activity) would be even more staggering (and much less 
costly): 48 times the totals benefits of REACH. 
 
Table 2: Relative importance of selected risk factors 
Risk factor  as % of total deaths  as % of total DALYs 
Tobacco  14.9%  11.7% 
Physical inactivity  11.7%  4.8% 
Hypertension  11.1%  3.9% 
Alcohol  1.2%  10.3% 
Air pollution  0.9%  0.5% 
Unsafe sex  0.8%  2.0% 
Illicit drugs  0.4%  2.3% 
 
Additional important non-chemical health hazards, not covered by table 2, are 
sunlight, suicide, fire (with an annual death toll in Germany of more than 500),  
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water (more than 500 Germans drown each year), crime, infections in hospitals, 
sudden infant death (affects about 1000 children in Germany each year), depres-
sions after having lost the job, mobile phones, prolonged air travel in narrow 
seats, natural or cosmic radiation, natural disasters such as floods and storms, food 
poisoning form natural causes, various diseases other than AIDS or Hepatitis 
which are related to leisure activities, traffic accidents, accidents at work and at 
home, excessive noise (which according to health experts kills at least 2000 indi-
viduals each year in Germany), and various sports. Among women under 20, a 
prominent cause of death and injury is falling from a horse. 
Most of these health hazards are more dangerous, and less costly to remove, than 
the risks which are targeted by REACH. Even singling out cancer as one of the 
most dreaded and important causes of death, the contribution of man-made 
chemicals is rather small. Table 3, from Doll and Peto (1981), gives the then 
prevailing causes of cancer deaths in the U.S.
20. According to Peto (2001), the 
proportion of deaths attributable to food additives, pollution, industrial products 




Table 3: Proportion of cancer deaths attributable to various risk factors 
Factor  % of all cancer deaths 
Diet  35% 
Tobacco  30% 
Infections  10% 
Sexual behaviour  7% 
UV light and natural 
inonizing radiation 
5% 
Occupation  4% 
Pollution  2% 
Medical procedures  1% 
Industrial products  < 1% 
Food additives  < 1%  
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Many of these cancer deaths are easily avoidable. There is thus ample scope to 
engage in useful regulation, if the aim of regulation really were to maximize 
public health in a world of finite resources. 
This does not seem to be what REACH is really about. Rather, it appears that 
REACH is one more effort at stigmatizing man-made chemicals, at the cost of 
ignoring more substantial risks from other sources. By following this strategy, 
REACH is further contributing to a worldwide tendency among regulatory 
agencies to fall victim to the well known “synthetic risk bias”: “The principal 
pattern … is that the synthetic character of the risk is a driving force behind the 
probability of regulation, controlling for the risk level. … For the range of 
variation of riskiness reflected in this sample, it is not the risk posed by the 
chemicals, but rather the character of the risk that seems to be most instrumental 
in driving regulatory decisions”
22  
This is not a mental defect of the regulators, but rather a reflection of a pervasive 
and well documented attitude among individuals, already referred to in section 3 
above, to overestimate man-made and to underestimate natural hazards to health 
and the environment. As shown by Ames et al., 99.99% of all dietary pesticides 
are natural, and “current levels of pesticide residues or water pollution are likely 
to be of minimal concern relative to the background level of natural substances”. 
However, modern media suggest the opposite. “Toxicological examination of 
synthetic chemicals such as pesticides and industrial pollutants, without similar 
examination of the chemicals in the natural world to use for comparison, has 
generated an imbalance in both data and perception about potential hazards to 
humans.”
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And it is exactly this “imbalance in both data and perception” which is the core 




6. Summary and Outlook 
The EU Commission’s estimate of the monetary benefits of REACH is wrong for 
various independent reasons. The first one is a mismatch between the World Bank 
scenario on which the estimated benefits are based and the scope of the REACH 
program: the hazards underlying the World Bank scenario do not appear to be the 
ones targeted by REACH. This mismatch notwithstanding, the EU Commission 
overestimates the benefits of REACH in at least three stages of its argument: 
(i) The monetary value which individuals attach to a statistical life saved by 
REACH is quite exaggerated. 
(ii) The number of years of life saved (which is the relevant quantity to be related 
to statistical deaths) is less than one tenth of the number of alleged DALYs saved. 
(iii) The willingness to pay for one additional year of life is not correctly related 
to the willingness to pay to avoid one statistical death. 
Taken together, these errors amount to an overestimation of the benefits of 
REACH by a factor of at least 10, but maybe more. And even this might be overly 
optimistic in view of the doubts raised in section 2 about the net number of 
DALYs saved by REACH. The figure of 45000 quoted by the commission refers 
mainly to gross effects and ignores possible negative side effects of REACH. 
Taking these into account as well might easily annihilate any benefits altogether 
(always keeping in mind that even the gross figure of 45000 DALYs is highly 
questionable due to the incongruity between the World Bank scenario and the 
scope of REACH).  
An independent argument concerns the efficiency of REACH and the synthetic 
risk bias which seems to be its driving force. Because of this synthetic risk bias, 
REACH still appears to be a tremendous waste of money even one took its alleged 
benefits for granted. Given the enormous number of competing risks to life and 
health other than man-made chemicals, which are much easier to eliminate, the 
EU commission’s chemicals policy appears to grow out of what some call a 
“tunnel vision” among regulatory agencies who are trying, to once more quote  
21 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, “to go that last mile to the point 
where it brings about more harm than good”. According to Breyer, few additional 
gains are made in terms of public health and safety when such a strategy is 
followed. “Removing that last little bit [of risk] can involve limited technological 
choice, high cost, devotion of considerable agency resources, large legal fees, and 
endless argument.” 
This is what REACH might well bring about: Limited technological choice, high 
cost, devotion of considerable resources , large legal fees, and endless argument. 
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